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Abstract
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are designed to monitor a networked environ-
ment and generate alerts whenever abnormal activities are detected. The number of
these alerts can be very large making their evaluation by security analysts a difficult
task. The management is complicated by the need to configure the different compo-
nents of alert evaluation systems. In addition, IDS alert management techniques, such
as clustering and correlation, suffer from involving unrelated alerts in their processes
and consequently provide results that are inaccurate and difficult to manage. Thus, the
tuning of an IDS alert management system in order to provide optimal results remains
a major challenge, which is further complicated by the large spectrum of potential
attacks the system can be subject to.
This thesis considers the specification and configuration issues of FuzMet, a novel
IDS alert management system which employs several metrics and a fuzzy-logic based
approach for scoring and prioritizing alerts. In addition, it features an alert rescoring
technique that leads to a further reduction of the number of alerts. We study the impact
of different configurations of the proposed metrics on the accuracy and completeness
of the alert scores generated by FuzMet. Our approach is validated using the 2000
DARPA intrusion detection scenario specific datasets and comparative results between
the Snort IDS alert scoring and FuzMet alert prioritization scheme are presented. A
considerable number of simulations were conducted in order to determine the optimal
configuration of FuzMet with selected simulation results presented and analyzed.
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1.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
Network attacks are growing more serious, forcing system defenders to deploy appro-
priate security devices such as firewalls, Information Protection Systems IPSs, and/or
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). IDSs are either software or a hardware system,
whose purpose is to inspect user and/or network activity by looking for suspicious ac-
tivities that violate the system security policy. Suspicious activities could be caused by
an attacker’s attempt to access the systems from the Internet, authorized users trying
to gain additional privileges for which they are not authorized, and authorized users
who misuse the privileges given to them. In each case, IDS generates alerts notifying
the security analysts about the anomalous incidents in order to take appropriate action.
IDSs can be categorized into two main classes based on what type of data they
are inspecting namely, Network-based and Host-based IDS [9]. The Network-based
IDS (NIDS) monitor the traffic transmitted from/to all devices on the network based
on its place. This type of IDSs deals only with the packets data type to find intru-
sions. Several advantages are offered by NIDS. For example one NIDS can protect
a large network base and deploying NIDS does not interfere with the normal opera-
tion of a network [3]. However, drawbacks of NIDS include dropping packets when
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monitoring/analyzing fast/busy links, inability to analyze encrypted information, and
the inability to verify the success of the attack [33]. The second class of IDSs is the
Host-based IDS (HIDS) which analyze the activities within the host such as operating
system audit trails and system/application logs. Unlike the NIDS, HIDS can observe
the outcome of an attempted attack. However, HIDS can be disabled easily by at-
tacker who compromises the host. Generally, NIDS and HIDS are complimentary to
each other, since they are detecting different type of attacks.
Nevertheless, there are two common types of IDSs based on their method of in-
specting the traffic: signature-based and anomaly-based [9]. The signature-based IDS
generates an alert when the traffic contains a pattern that matches signatures of ma-
licious or suspicious activities. In turn, the anomaly-based IDS examines ongoing
activity and detects the attack based on the variation from normal behavior. How-
ever, both types suffer from a common problem of generating a large number of alerts.
These alerts need to be evaluated by security analysts before any further investigation
in order to take appropriate actions against the attacks.
1.2 Alert Management in Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems
After deploying IDS, handling alerts that are generated is the first task that the security
analyst should do. The challenge of IDS is not only by detecting intrusions but also by
managing alerts. Since the number of these alerts can be very large and mixed with
high false positive rate; making the management task of security analysts difficult to
handle which accordingly he/she could not identify the real attacks from the false ones
reported by the alerts. Several methods can be applied to manage alerts effectively.
Reducing the large number of alerts is of alert management. Also, differentiating
between legitimate alerts and false alerts is another task that security administrator
should accomplish in order to determine whether the actual attack is occurring. Since
attackers reach the final goal by launching their attacks in multiple steps, building the
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attacker’s scenarios can be achieved by alerts management techniques. Generally, alert
management techniques provide an effective ways to help the security administrator to
evaluate and manage alerts, thereby saving his or her time and effort.
There are two general alert management classes namely low-level and high-level.
Dealing with each alert individually to enrich its attributes or assign scores based on
potential impact can fall into the low-level alert operations. high-level alert manage-
ment techniques deal with a group of alerts and provide an general view of these alerts
(i.e. such as aggregation, clustering, correlation, and fusion). Low-level and high-level
alert management techniques are complementary to each other. First alerts need to be
enriched by the low-level operation and then the high-level proceeds the enriched alert
to provide more accurate results.
1.3 Motivation
IDSs usually generate a large number of alerts whenever abnormal activities are de-
tected [14]. Inspecting and investigating all reported alerts manually is a difficult,
error-prone, and time-consuming task. On the other hand, ignoring alerts might lead
to successful attacks. Dealing with this problem is a challenging task which involves
two alert evaluation phases: low-level and high-level. The low-level alert operations
deal with each alert individually to enrich its attributes or assign a score to it based on
potential risk. High-level alert management techniques, such as aggregation, clustering,
correlation, and fusion, were proposed to deal with a set of alerts and provide an ab-
straction of these alerts. However, the high-level techniques suffer from including alerts
that are not significant which consequently leads to inappropriate results. Therefore,
low-level evaluation techniques are needed to examine large number of alerts automat-
ically (or semi-automatically) and prioritize them, leaving only important alerts for
further inspection and investigation. Accordingly, the reduced set of alerts leads to
more precise high-level alert management results such as correlation and clustering.
The goal of this work is that the security administrator will be provided with an ef-
fective technique to evaluate and manage alerts, thereby saving his or her time and
effort.
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In addition, it is not only sufficient to propose new IDS alert management systems,
yet there is a need to study the degree of efficiency of these systems depending on
different configuration sets. The tuning of an IDS alert management system in order
to provide optimal results remains a major challenge. This hurdle is further complicated
by the large spectrum of potential attacks the system can be subject to. There is also
a need to consider whether there exist a unique optimal configuration which works all
the time or whether this optimal configuration changes depending on system state and
administrative policies.
1.4 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. We proposed FuzMet, an alert evaluation and prioritization framework, by ad-
dressing the limitations of previous works that deal with alert ranking [31,23,32,
46]. Unlike the previous works, the use of new metrics such as, the sensor sensi-
tivity, relationship between alerts, services stability, and social activity between
source and target, allows us to accurately evaluate the alerts generated by either
a signature-base or anomaly-based IDS. In addition, The automatic evaluation
and prioritization processes make the management task for the security analysts
easier and controllable.
2. A re-scoring technique that dynamically scores alerts based on the relationship
between attacks or the level of maliciousness of attackers.
3. We applied Fuzzy-logic Inference approach as a reasoning technique to quanti-
tatively score each alert based on the values of the metrics defined earlier. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use Fuzzy-logic for evaluating IDS
alerts.
4. A comprehensive study of the impact of different configurations of the proposed
metrics on the accuracy and completeness of the alert scores generated by FuzMet.
5. A survey and taxonomy of IDS alert management techniques.
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1.5 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the background
and provide literature survey of alert management techniques in IDS including alert
prioritization approaches. Chapter 3 describes our proposed FuzMet alert prioritization
scheme along with the metrics and the Fuzzy-logic approach that we used to score IDS
alerts. Chapter 3 also investigates metrics configuration issues. Simulation results are
presented and discussed in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis.
Chapter 2
Background and Literature Survey
2.1 Why Alert Management
An alert in intrusion detection systems is typically a formatted message describing a
circumstance relevant to network/host security that is derived from critical events [44].
Generated alerts are presented to the security administrators or some automatic control
system. This allows to notify the security administrator about the abnormal activity
that has been detected, and consequently take the proper action against the attack.
Most of the time, security analysts are overwhelmed by the large number of alerts gen-
erated by IDS(s), as well as the high rate of false positives [29,19]. As a result, security
administrators cannot easily distinguish between the alerts generated from legitimate
traffic and the ones generated from suspicious traffic by the information provided by
the alerts. In this content, alert management techniques were proposed to assist secu-
rity administrators in better understanding the state of the network/host under attack.
For instance, IDS alert prioritization techniques aim to score each alert based on its
seriousness and impact and prioritize the high scored alert, which consequently reduce
the overall number of alerts that are presented to security administrators. Alert cor-
relation is another example of an IDS alert management technique, where the steps of
the attack are linked together and the attack graph is constructed. Alert correlation
helps the security administrators to understand the steps of an attack from its first
6
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step to its final goal. Generally, alert management techniques are essential steps after
detecting the attack by the IDS.
2.2 IDS Alert Representation- IDEMF
Alert representation is the method that allows the IDS to provide the information
about an attack to the security administrators. The alert representation format varies
from one IDS product to another based on the strategy of each IDS to present the
attack. Since each IDS has it own representation format, it becomes difficult to deploy
different IDS products in the same network or to exchange data between heterogenous
IDSs. Therefore, standard alert representation formats have been proposed to deal
with the above problem.
The Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) is a standard for-
mat(RFC 4765) developed by Curry and Debar in the Intrusion Detection Working
Group (IDWG) [1]. This standard defines a data format for describing the suspicious
events that can be reported by the IDS [8]. IDMEF is an XML based specification for
an intrusion alert format. IDMEF is used between an IDS and the manager to which
it sends alerts. The IDMEF data model is an object-oriented representation of the alert.
Under the top-level class of the IDMEF-message, there are two types of messages;
Alerts and Heartbeats. For the Alert message subclass, low-level subclasses are used
to present detailed information about the event that has been detected by the IDS,
as shown in fig 2.2. Whenever an IDS detects an intrusion, it generates an alert
message class to its manager(s), which contains several subclasses. The Analyzer
subclass carries unique information about the sensor that generated the alert. Three
time subclasses are provided in the alert message. The time when the analyzer gen-
erated the alert is described in the Createtime subclass. Attack detection time is
shown in the Detecttime subclass. The current time on the analyzer is describe in the
AnalyzerT ime. The source and the target of the event leading up to the alert are
represented in the Source and Target subclasses, respectively. The Classification
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Figure 2.1: The IDMEF data model
subclass carries information about the name of the alert (attack) and some references
that allow the IDS manager to obtain more information about the reported attack. The
impact of the event, response actions taken by the analyzer, as well as the analyzer
confidence can be described in the Assessment subclass. The last subclass in the alert
message is the AdditionalData which can be used for presenting any information that
does not fit into the data model.
For the second class of an IDMEF message, the Heartbeat messages class is trig-
gered by the IDS to be sent periodically to show its current status. Several advantages
are offered by the design of IDMEF format including:
• Flexibility to accommodate the needs of different IDSs, since one may wish to
deliver more or less information about certain types of attacks.
• Capability of presenting messages generated by both network and host based
sensors.
• The ease of extensions, either by using AdditionalData objects or by defining
new object types.
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However, IDMEF also has some disadvantages, such as:
• The format limits the semantic representation (i.e. two IDSs can name the attacks
differently) [45].
• Difficulties in creating an equivalent objectoriented representation in a relational
databases such as SQL.
2.3 IDS Alert Management Approaches
Alert management functions receive the alerts from IDS(s) and process them in order
to make them suitable for human control. The general purpose of these techniques is to
help the security administrator to fully understand what the IDS is addressing. In other
words, all alert management techniques such as, alert fusion, alert aggregation, alert
clustering, and alert correlation provide some form of high-level analysis and reasoning
capabilities beyond low-level sensor abilities [34]. For instance, security analysts can
be flooded by a large number of alerts in a short period of time, making the task of
managing these number of alerts manually difficult; therefore, reduction techniques are
needed. Another example for showing the need of alert management techniques can be
seen in enterprise networks, where security administrators can deploy heterogeneous
IDSs in different places; therefore, aggregating the alerts that have some common
features together in a centralized place is the task of the aggregation function. In the
following subsections we will briefly describe the most common IDS alert management
techniques.
2.3.1 Alert Reduction
One of the biggest problems associated with IDS is the number of alerts. IDSs usually
generate large number of alerts whenever abnormal activities are transmitted from/to
the protected network and/or hosts. It is common that an IDS reports 10-200 alerts
per day and this number increases when more than one IDS is deployed [24]. These
number of alerts can easily overwhelm the security analysts who manage the IDSs
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in the network. Accordingly, the task of managing the alerts becomes very difficult;
therefore, the security analysts will not fully understand the reported alerts, so that
action against the detected attack will be taken. Therefore, techniques for reducing
the number of alerts generated by IDS(s) are needed. Several alert management tech-
niques were proposed to deal with this problem from different angles, but all of them
fall into reducing the number of alerts. In this section, we first categorize the proposed
approaches of decreasing the number of alerts by their procedure, and then describe
each process individually providing the state-of-the-art approaches that exist in the
field. However, reducing the number of alerts can be done either before the IDS raises
the alerts or after the alerts are generated. Tuning the IDS, placing it correctly, or
configuring it efficiently are examples of the techniques that deal with reducing the
number of IDS alerts before they are generated, while, the techniques that treat the
raised alerts include alert merging, and clustering. The reduction techniques can be
described as follows:
Alert Aggregation: When IDS(s) generates the alerts, aggregation techniques
try to group a set of alerts together that have some common characteristics, such as
the source, the target, and the type of the attack. In the case of dealing with one IDS
or multiple homogenous IDSs, these techniques can be applied easily sice the alerts
format is the same. However, these methods become more complicated when heteroge-
nous IDSs are deployed. Generally, these techniques relieve the security analysts from
dealing with each alert individually. Debar and Wespi presented an aggregation algo-
rithm that is used in the design and implementation of an intrusion-detection console
built on top of the Tivoli Enterprise Console (TEC) [10]. In this approach, alerts are
aggregated into so-called ”situations”, which are a set of alerts that share certain char-
acteristics. Three alert attributes were involved to form the ”situation”, which are the
source, the target, and the class of the attack.
Alert Merging: As we discussed earlier, the IDS generates too many elemen-
tary alerts that confuse the security administrators. Consequently, alerts need to be
grouped together to form a global alert that gives the analyst a better understanding
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of the intrusion as described in the aggregation function. Alert merging techniques
aim to combine a group of alerts into one hyper-alert that represents the abstract view
of the underlaying alerts. For instance, an attacker performs a scan attack all hosts’
ports in one subnet, seeking an open-vulnerable port for a further attack. As a result,
IDS will generate too many alerts related to these scan attacks. However, generating
one global alert informing the security administrators that the attacker is scanning all
the sub-network will save the administrator effort, time, and most importantly he will
take the appropriate action against the seriousness of the attack. Yu et al proposed a
merging process that is applied to a group of alerts (cluster) that produce a synthesized
alert [46]. Since alerts can be received from multiple IDSs, conflict might occur between
alert attributes. They use a voting algorithm to solve the conflict by considering the
dominant characteristic of the alerts participating in the conflict. Cuppens proposed
another merging technique that uses expert rules to specify how the global alert is
derived from a set of alerts [7]. In this method, four alert attributes are involved in the
merging process namely, source, target, time, and classification. Conflict resolution is
applied by specifying an integrity constraint that should not be violated. If so, the
conflicting information will be provided in the additional data attribute of the global
alert. Generally, merging techniques attempt to create a new alert as a representation
of various of alerts that belong to same attack.
Alert Clustering: IDSs generate a number of similar alarms that represent one
attack. Similar alarms can be grouped together to reduce the total number of IDS
alerts. Alert clustering is a technique that groups alerts that share common features,
such as source/target IP address or port number into one cluster. Each cluster con-
tains alerts that share similar attributes. Several approaches have been proposed to
cluster the alerts generated by IDSs. K. Julisch proposed a clustering technique based
on forming a generalized view of false alarms [19]. The objective of this clustering
technique is to discover root causes of the false positive alerts. In this research, Julisch
discovers that 90% of the alerts correspond to a small number of root causes. Identi-
fying and removing these root causes leads to a 82% reduction of the total number of
alerts, making the IDS analysts focus on the alerts of the real attack. Another clus-
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tering technique was proposed by Cuppens [7] as part of the MIRADOR project [26].
First, alerts are transformed from XML format into rational database format. Then,
an expert system is used to decide when a new alert can join (or form) the cluster.
This decision is based on the similarity requirement defined by expert rules.
Network-based IDS Placement: Security administrators have full flexibility
to deploy network-based IDSs in any place in their network where they can perform a
better detection. However, the place of a network-based IDS can be one of the reasons
that a large number of alerts are produced. For instance, one can deploy the IDS to
monitor the traffic before it is filtered by the firewall to detect all attack trails, re-
gardless of whether they are stopped by the firewall [5]. In this scenario, the IDS will
generate more alerts than if it was deployed behind the firewall. In general, the place
of the network-based IDS can be a trade-off between maximizing the protection and
minimizing the number of alert generation.
Deactivating or Improving IDS Signatures: In signature-based IDSs, all
known attacks are stored as signatures which have to be matched within the traffic.
Disabling unnecessary signatures that detect normal traffic as abnormal can poten-
tially reduce the number of alerts. For instance, if the system administrator allows
remote login to the system while the IDS raises an alert whenever this service is used,
then disabling the signature that is related to the remote access service will reduce the
number of alerts generated by the IDS. Also, knowledge of the system environment
allows the system administrator to disable any unrelated signatures from the database.
For example, employing an IDS for Windows environments requires the system ad-
ministrator to disable any signature related to the Unix environment. Nonetheless,
in signature based IDSs, security experts write vulnerability signatures to accurately
match the exact attack pattern without making any false positives. However, poorly
written signatures can lead to false positives if legitimate traffic unexpectedly matches
the attack signature [5]. Therefore, the quality of the attack signature has an effect
on the number of generated alerts. Poor signatures need to be rewritten and improved
to accurately represent the pattern of only the real attack. As a result, the number of
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alerts will be reduced to the detection of the actual attack.
Tuning the anomaly-based IDS: As we mentioned in section 1.1, the anomaly-
based IDS monitors the traffic and raises alerts whenever a traffic varies from the norm
by a ceratin threshold. The number of alerts in this type of IDS can be very large
compared with the signature-based IDS. However, the number of alarms can be re-
duced by tuning the anomaly-based IDS. Tuning the anomaly-based IDS can be done
by setting the threshold to a proper value so that the number of alarms will be reduced.
However, adjusting the threshold value to reduce the number of alerts can either in-
crease or decrease the detection. When the detection rate increases the number of false
negative alerts increases [5]. But, when the detection rate decreases, then the rate of
false positive alerts increases. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the number of
alerts and the detection capability in the anomaly-based IDS.
2.3.2 Alert Correlation
Generally, correlation can be defined as the method of finding the relationship between
two objects or series of objects. Specifically, the process of discovering the connection
between different series of security events is defined as the alert correlation process.
Attackers usually launch their attacks in multiple steps to achieve the final goal. Con-
sequently, traditional IDSs focus on low level attacks and generate alerts for each one
individually. In this case, security analysts face difficulties in manually checking the
alert log to find the relationship between the attacks, since the number of alerts is large
and the rate of false positives is high. Therefore, alert correlation techniques become es-
sential techniques in order to uncover the relationship between alerts, and to construct
the corresponding attack scenarios. Researchers proposed several techniques that deal
with this problem which fall into three classes. The first class includes correlating alerts
based on the similarity of the attributes, such as IP addresses, ports etc. The second
class is based on specifying a known sequence of attacks. The third class is based
on the dependencies between alerts by matching prerequisites with the consequences
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of attacks. The three alert correlation classes will be described in more detail as follows:
Correlating alerts based on similarity: An alert is usually divided into a
number of attributes such as, source IP address, target IP address, port number for
the source and the target, time, and attack type. In this class, alerts will be corre-
lated together if their attributes are similar. Similarity functions are computed on the
alerts attributes to make the correlation decision. In fact, these techniques promise to
correlate some alerts that are sharing some features such as the source and target IPs.
However, they fail to uncover the casual relationship between alerts. Valdes and Skinner
developed a probabilistic alert correlation method aiming to correlate multiple attack
steps and build the corresponding attacks scenarios [37]. Their probabilistic approach
suggested a unified mathematical framework with appropriate similarity functions for
each appropriate alert feature. Alerts will be correlated if the results of the similarity
functions are closely matched, subject to meet a minimum degree of matching which is
controlled by both a single configurable parameter and the weighted average of similar-
ity values over the overlapping features. Any new alert will be merged with an existing
meta alert as long as they result in the highest similarity values and pass the specified
threshold.
Attack scenario predefinition: In this type of correlation method, alerts will
be correlated based on the known attack scenarios. Attack scenarios can be defined
by security experts or learned through training datasets. The alerts sequence will be
compared with the known attack scenario in order to correlate them together and con-
struct the detected attack steps. These methods can discover the causal relationship
between attacks, but they are restricted to known attack strategies.
The dependencies between attacks: Most alerts are related to different alerts,
since the early steps of attack prepare for later ones. Based on this observation, the
connections (or relationship) between these alerts can be used to construct an attack
scenario. Several techniques have been proposed to construct an attack plan by cor-
relating alerts based on the prerequisites (what makes the attack successful) and the
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consequences (what are the outputs of the attack) of each attack (corresponding alert).
Two attacks will be correlated if any of the prerequisites of the later attack match any
of the consequences of the early one. For these techniques to work, specific knowledge
about the attacks are required to identify their prerequisites and consequences. These
techniques promise to discover the casual relationship between alerts, and they are not
restricted to known attack scenarios. However, they have a common weakness, that
is, they fail to correlate unknown attacks (that they have no specific prerequisites and
consequence). Ning et al. use logical predicates to model the alert as prerequisites and
consequences of attacks [28]. The idea of the ”hyper-alert” was introduced to represent
every type of attack. A hyper-alert consists of facts, prerequisites, and consequences.
A fact is a set of names (for attributes). Prerequisites and consequences form a logical
combination of predicates where its variable can be found in fact. For instance, con-
sider the buffer overflow attack against the remote administrator to ”Sadmind.” The
type of hyper-alert will be:
SadmindBufferOverflow = ((V ictimIP , V ictimPort), (ExistHost(V ictimIP )
∧
V ulnerableSadmind(V ictimIP )), (GainRootAccess(V ictimIP )))
2.3.3 Alerts Visualization
IDSs report the alerts to the security analysts in row format stored in a database. Un-
derstanding the general view of what these alerts are addressing is difficult to achieve
from looking at the alerts records. Therefore, alert visualization techniques were pro-
posed to deal with this issue. These techniques will take the row alerts and represent
all alerts visually. This visual representation can help the network administrator to
have an overall picture of what is occurring in the network. For instance, visualizing
all events targeting one specific host can cut down the time for the analyst to under-
stand the reported situation. As a result, security analysts can efficiently analyze a
graphical layout of alert logs easier and faster than analyzing alert textual logs. Several
approaches have been proposed to visualize the alerts of an IDS. One example of the
existing tools that visualize Snort IDS alarm log is SnortView [20].
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2.3.4 Alert Scoring & Prioritization
Inspection devices, such as IDS, present attacks to a security administrator through
alerts. The IDS often generates a large number of alerts. However, these alerts should
not be treated equally since their importance and impact are different. Therefore, alert
scoring and prioritizing techniques are needed to determine the important alerts to a
security administrator for further action. Indeed, few works have been proposed to
deal with this problem.
Porras et al [30] developed a prototype system called M-Correaltor, which ranked
alerts based on the likelihood of success, the importance of victims, and attack type
interest. The likelihood of success examines the matching between the vulnerability
requirement and the target topology. Alerts are also prioritized based on the degree
to which they targeted critical assets, and the amount of interest the user has towards
the attack type. Mathematically, each incident will be ranked using an adoption of
Bayesian belief network. As shown in figure 2.2, the Bayesian tree is made of three
main branches: outcome, relevance, and priority. The outcome branch represents the
information provided by the security devices. The priority subtree represents both the
incident class importance and the severity of the attack. The last branch concerns the
compression between the target environment and the vulnerability requirement of the
corresponding attack. Bays net is used here because it is effective even with the lack
of information in the network, such as the relevance subtree.
Jinqiao Yu et al [46] evaluated alerts based on two aspects: first, alerts that do
not correspond to any attack in the vulnerability knowledgebase will be prioritized for
further investigation; second, the applicability of the attack towards the protected net-
work is checked. Similarly, Qin and Lee [32] prioritize alerts based on their relevance
to the protected networks and hosts, as well as the severity level of the corresponding
attacks assessed by security experts. As shown in figure 2.3, this technique employed
the simple structure of Bayesian networks (one level) to compute the priority values
for each alert. For each alert, Jinqiao Yu et al compared the relevance of the attack
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Figure 2.2: M-Correlator Incident Ranking
Figure 2.3: Alert Priority Computation Model
reported in the alert against the configuration of the target networks which include
OS, Service/port, and Applications. The the existence of the target service/user in
the hosts configuration was also analyzed. The interest of attacks can be specified
by the security analysts based on the nature and mission of the attack. Finally, the
compression results will be evaluated by the Bayesian networks.
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Figure 2.4: Alert Management Techniques Classification
2.4 Classification of Alert Management Techniques
Alert management techniques can be divided into two general classes: low-level and
high-level. The low-level alert operations deal with each alert individually to enrich
its attributes or assign scores based on potential risk. high-level alert management
techniques, such as aggregation, clustering, correlation, and fusion, were proposed to
deal with a set of alerts and provide an abstraction of these alerts. In fact, low-
level alert preparation methods can help the high-level operations to provide more
accurate results. For example, low-level evaluation techniques can examine a large
number of alerts automatically (or semi-automatically) and prioritize them, leaving
only important alerts for further inspection and investigation. As a result, high-level
techniques will improve their outcomes due to the early low-level evaluation steps.
Baker and Benaten described the alert management techniques separation issue with
its benefit [4]. As shown in fig 2.4, low-level alert preparation techniques receive alerts
from IDSs and enhance them before the high-level alert operations take place.
2.5 Comparison of Alert Prioritization techniques
In this section, we briefly revisit the alert ranking techniques before comparing them.
Porras et al. ranked alerts based on their applicability, target importance, and attack
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Table 2.1: Alert Prioritization techniques Comparison
M-correlator TRINETR Qin’s Approach
Signature-based alert Yes Yes Yes
Anomaly-based alert some All No
Zero-day attack No No No
Training (Bays net) Yes No Yes
severity [30]. Jinqiao Yu et al. calculated the alert priority based on its applicability
and its existence in the vulnerability knowledgebase [46]. Qin and Lee evaluated the
alert based on attack severity and its applicability.
As shown in table 2.1, All techniques can successfully evaluate and prioritize alerts
generated by signature-based IDSs. This capability is due to that the signatures provide
more information about the corresponding attacks. However, in the case of anomaly-
based IDS alerts, M-correlater will prioritize all the alerts that target important assets.
In this context, non-critical alerts that target critical machines will be prioritized even
if these alerts should not be prioritized. TRINETR will prioritize all alerts generated by
the anomaly-based IDS since this approach prioritizes any alerts that have no reference.
Finally, Qin’s approach completely fails to evaluate these types of alerts. M-correlater
and Qin’s approach need to train the Bayesian network in order to provide accurate
results whereas TRINETR is required to encode too much expert rules. Generally,
these techniques are promising to evaluate alerts generated by signature-based IDSs,
but they cannot correctly evaluate alerts raised by anomaly-based IDSs, since they
heavily rely on the vulnerability knowledge base of the known attacks.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we explained the need of alert management in intrusion detection
systems. The standard alert representation format, IDMEF, was described in more
detail due to its wide acceptance in the IDS research community. We tried to briefly
cover all of the state-of-the-art management techniques that deal with IDS alert. Alert
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scoring and prioritization approaches were studied extensively. Generally, All alert
management techniques aim to help the security analysts to understand what the IDS
is stating and accordingly appropriate actions will be taken
Chapter 3
Alert Evaluation Architecture and
Priority Scheme
In this chapter, we present FuzMet, an approach for prioritizing alerts generated by
IDS, aiming to make the management process of the security analysts effortless and
accurate. First, we generally explain FuzMet architecture and how it works. As we
discussed in 2.3.4, researchers have proposed number of criteria to prioritized alerts
which are not excluded from the following ones: the applicability of the attack, the
severity of attack, and importance of the asset. However, in section 3.2, we extensively
describe FuzMet metrics that are used to prioritize alerts and how they differ from
the existing ones. The Fuzzy-logic reasoning approach and the advantages of using
it in FuzMet scheme are shown in section 3.3. A re-scoring technique is presented in
section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we present FuzMet configuration related issues. Finally,
conclusion of the scoring and re-scoring approaches as well as the configuration issues
are presented in section 3.6.
3.1 FuzMet Architecture Overview
This section describes FuzMet- an automatic IDS alert evaluation approach. The latter
assists security analysts in automatically measuring the seriousness of each alert based
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Figure 3.1: General Evaluation Process
on some criteria. We logically assign a numerical score to the alert using fuzzy logic.
Typically, IDS alert management techniques, such as clustering and correlation, suffer
from involving unrelated alerts in their processes. This consequently lead to imprecise
results. Therefore, we introduce an alert rescoring technique that allows to a further
reduction of the number of alerts.
As shown in figure 3.1 in the doted areas, FuzMet alert management architecture
involves three main components: (a) data collection, (b) alert scoring metrics and
inference, and (c) alert analysis.
3.1.1 Data Collection
Data collection includes four main resources: alert attributes, monitored environment,
security administrator parameters, and vulnerability knowledge base. Alert attributes
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consist of several fields that provide information about the attack. The information
provided varies from one IDS product to another. However, we assume that the alert
is compatible with IDMEF format [8], which has recently became an industry stan-
dard. In the protected environment, we need some information to help us evaluate IDS
alerts. Different environments contain different parameters based on the running ser-
vices, applications, or operating systems. The security administrator of the protected
network can specify the parameters that are involved in the evaluation process. For
instance, we need information about all running services, applications, and operating
systems, such as version, release time and existing vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the
security administrator can specify the importance of each host in the network includ-
ing the monitoring devices, the IDS. The public vulnerability knowledge bases, such
as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [25] and Bugtraq [17], contain detailed
information about known attacks. The availability of such data bases can help in the
alert evaluation process. The data collection component makes the above resources
available to the alert scoring metrics & inference component.
3.1.2 Priority Metrics & Inference
Priority metrics and inference constitute the core components of FuzMet architecture.
Based on the information received from the data collection component, several metrics
are computed and used as indicators to accurately evaluate the alerts. In this per-
spective, the computed metric values are passed to the Fuzzy-logic inference engine to
calculate the overall alert score. The scoring metrics and reasoning approach will be
discuss in more details in the later sections.
3.1.3 Alert analysis
This component provides an additional evaluation of the IDS alert. This component
includes four main functions namely, rescoring, attack distance, occurrence time, and
response plan. In this thesis, we investigate the rescoring function whereas the other
functions have been described briefly and included in the our future works.
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3.1.4 Flow Illustration
The flow of the evaluation diagram shown in figure 3.1 illustrates the alert evaluation
process. First, the monitored environment information, the security administrator
parameters, and the vulnerability knowledge base should be available before an alert
is generated by the IDS. Second, when the alert is raised for evaluation, we compute
the value of each scoring metric (which we will describe in detail later) based on the
input data from the first step. Then, a fuzzy logic inference is used as a reasoning with
the large number of alerts and present an abstraction of these technique to score each
alert based on the metric values. The alert is then stored in the alert database with its
score. The alert is also passed to the alert analysis component for further investigation.
The analysis component measures the distance of the current attack from its possible
goals. It rescores the alerts that are suspicious to be a preparation step for later
attacks. It also detects suspicious activities which violate predefined system usage
(such as using a port number which is only allowed during working hours). Finally,
it provides a response plan to the intercepted attacks and makes it available to the
system administrator for further investigation. As result, high scored alerts stored in
the database can be presented to the security administrator for further investigation
where appropriate actions will be taken. Furthermore, High-level alert management
functions can benefit from the results offer by both the scoring and rescoring techniques
to provide accurate outcomes.
3.2 Alert Scoring Metrics
The alert scoring metrics shown in Figure 3.1 are used to evaluate the criticality of
alerts and to calculate a value for each one. Some of these metrics have been used in
previous works ( i.g., [31, 32, 46, 23]) but none associated all of them together. Addi-
tionally, we define new metrics that help us to accurately evaluate IDS alerts. FuzMet
scoring technique does not require all the metrics to be available during the evaluation.
Intuitively, the presence of a large number of indicators will definitely increase the
accuracy of the alert score. However, most of the metrics are easy to obtain, especially
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Figure 3.2: Attack Applicability Decision Process
those that deal with protected environments and the vulnerability knowledge base. We
will describe the alert scoring metrics in greater detail in the following subsections.
3.2.1 Applicability
Applicability is a process that checks whether an attack that raises an alert is applica-
ble in our environment or not. As shown in figure 3.2, in order to make a decision, this
process requires checking with one of the vulnerability knowledge bases and knowing
all the running services, applications, and operation systems. From alert’s attributes,
we extract the attack’s specification which uniquely identifies the attack. Then, we
can check with vulnerability knowledge bases to see whether the attack is applicable
in our network or not. To illustrate the process, first, information about the protected
environment and the attack should be available before the alert is generated. When-
ever alert is raised, we select the target address and the attack identification from its
attributes. From the environment knowledgebase, we can check what are the services
(also version) are running in the target address reported in the alert. Form the vulner-
ability knowledgebase, we can check the infected services by the reported attack. As
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result, if there is match between the running systems and any of the infected infected
system, attack will be considered applicable at this point. Otherwise, attack is mis-
takenly reported and the alert is treated as a false positive alert.
Furthermore, we further investigate the vulnerability that the attacker is trying to
exploit to check whether it is patched or not. If it is patched, then the attack will
be considered not applicable since there are no possibilities for that attack to success.
But, the attack will be considered applicable if the corresponding vulnerability has
not been patched. In general, figuring out the applicability of the attack on a given
network is reduced to a search problem.
3.2.2 Importance of Victim metric
This metric is used to specify the criticality of the target machine reported in the
alert. Several elements will participate in deciding the importance of the system in the
environment including services, applications, and accounts. The goal of this metric is
to increase the score of alerts related to suspicious activities that target critical system
components, such as a main server. Before introducing the function that calculates the
criticality of the target machine, we will present a general weighted equation that is
used in this metric and the rest of the thesis.
w′(a) = w(a)× a (3.1)
w(a) =

low if 0 ≤ a < thl,
med if thl ≤ a < thh,
high if thh ≤ a < 1.
(3.2)
Equation 3.1 aims to compute the value of any element based on its weight. A high
weight is chosen if the object is critical and vice versa. In this metric, the criticality
of a machine is calculated based on the running services/applications and the account
associated with them. Different services have different weights according to their im-
portance to the environment as well as the accounts. Equation 3.3 gives the formula
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Figure 3.3: Different IDSs Placement Values
used for the importance metric.
I(m) =
∑
s runs on m
w′(I(s)× I(Ac(s)))∑
s runs on m
w(I(s)× I(Ac(s)))
(3.3)
Importance describes the significance of the victim machine that is running in the
protected environment. The value of the importance is calculated on a scale from zero
to one. A zero indicates that the victim machine reported in the alert does not include
any important host, service, application, account, or directory. Scores closer to one
indicate that the attack is targeting critical system component.
3.2.3 Sensor Status
What part of the environment does the monitoring device cover? Is it configured? Is
it uptodate? What is its accuracy? Answering these questions for each sensor in the
environment will describe its status. Let Sensor Status denote the status of the IDS
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Table 3.1: Sensor Status Parameters
Variable Placement Configuration Up to Date Accuracy (BDR)
Critical Configure Updated
States Moderate Not Configure Not updated Probability (0-1)
Regular
that generates the alerts. The Sensor Status is affected by its placement, configuration,
uptodate and accuracy status. The security administrator has a full flexibility to deploy
multiple IDSs in different places in the environment. However, not all places have the
same value of sensitivity and criticality. The illustration example shown in figure 3.3
declares that several IDSs can be installed in a simple network to fully fulfill the security
requirements [14]. The IDS protecting the DeMilitarized Zone (DMZ), which includes
the Web and Mail servers, is considered to be in a critical place situation; therefore,
a high value will be chosen for this IDS placement parameter. In contradict, The IDS
running on monitoring the testing LAB segment has a low IDS placement value. For the
configuration parameter, security administrator is usually aware of the configuration
status of each IDS in the environment. This awareness is based on several constraints
such as, deactivating unnecessary signatures, tuning threshold value, and service and
rules compatibility. The uptodate status is determined based on the procedure of
applying all the relevant signatures including the most recent ones. Like the antivirus
tools, the IDSs vendors generate signature whenever a new attack is globally identified.
If the security administrator is perfectly tracking the vendors’ signatures generation
then the value of uptodate status will be high and vice versa. Finally, the accuracy
value of the sensor can be calculated offline using Bayesian Detection Rate (BDR)
proposed in literature by Stefan Axelsson [2].
Formally, let I and ¬I denote intrusive and nonintrusive behavior, respectively, and
A and ¬A denote the presence or absence of an intrusion alert. The Bayesian detection
rate is the is simply computing the probability of the true positive P (A/I) (alert is
raised given attack is present). In order to calculate the BDR formula, one uses the
past experience of the sensor inspection as follow:
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P (A|I) = P (I)P (A|I)
P (I)P (A|I) + P (¬I)P (A|¬I)
. (3.4)
Where:
- I: Attack has occurred.
- ¬I: No Attack has occurred.
- A: Alert has been raised.
- ¬A: No Alert has been raised.
Table 3.1 shows all possible values that can be entered by the security expert who
manages the sensors. For instance, if the place of the sensor is ”Critical”, its accuracy
is high, it is well Configured, and it is uptodate. Then we expect that the value of
the Sensor Status to be high. Accordingly, the final alert’s score will be increased.
Basically, this indicator helps us to treat the alert based on the confidence that we
have towards the sensor that generates the alert. The value of the Sensor Status is
computed based on the values of the four indicators following the formula:
Sensor status = γ1 × Place+ γ2 × Conf.+ γ3 × Update+ γ4 ×BDR (3.5)
3.2.4 Attack Severity
Severity score measures the risk levels posed by a particular vulnerability. Security
analysis sources, such as MITRE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [38],
Secunia [39],Internet Security Systems [40] and product’s corporation (e.g., Microsoft)
provide a severity score for all known attacks. For any raised alert, we will use multiple
scores provided by the above organizations and take the weighted average to represent
the severity score of the reported alert. The reasons behind involving multiple or-
ganizations to find the overall alert severity score are that each organization has its
own metrics to calculate the severity score value and the severity score value may vary
from one organization to another. For instance, the FileZilla unspecified format string
vulnerability has been reported in NIST as a very severe vulnerability scored 10 out
of 10 [41] unlike the Secunia who reported this vulnerability as a moderately criti-
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cal [42]. The goal of this metric is to present an accurate attack severity score which
accordingly affect the overall alert score. Each attack severity score can fall into one
of the three categorized classes namely high, medium, and low and a corresponding
weight is chosen. For instance, attack severity score with value 9 is considered to be
in the high class and the weight for this score will be high too. Doing this, allow us to
be more biased to the high severity score reported in several attack analysis sources.
Furthermore, we include the confidence value of each source that provides a severity
score for known attacks. The goal of this constraint is to increase the trustfulness of
the source which its services has been targeted. For example, if the attacker targeted
a Microsoft’s component (i.e. SQL server) then the attack severity score provided by
Microsoft will have more trust values among the other participant scores. However,







SS(a) represents the severity of the attack that triggers the alert. Security analysis
experts publish severity scores (SS) for all discovered vulnerabilities. Several opinions
from multiple vulnerability analysis databases will be collected as well as the opinion
of the vendor whose service is being targeted. However, severity score representations
come in different formats: numeric or categorical. Therefore, we would first normalize
the severity score to a value between zero and one. Then, we can calculate the weighted
average of the participants’ severity scores as shown in equation 3.6. Obviously, the
high severity score opinion will be given a high weight and vice versa.
3.2.5 Service vulnerability metric
We adopt the method proposed by Abedin et al [13] to analyze only the service that
the attacker is targeting. This method is used to calculate a unified score representing
the strength or weakness of the targeted service. The result is then used in the overall
alert scoring.
Since the targeted service is listed in the alert’s content, it is possible to check
the set of current vulnerabilities of that service. A second source of information is
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of Service Vulnerabilities Over Time
Generated from data provide in [18]
to mine the vulnerability knowledge bases to check how vulnerable this service has
been in the past. This is related to those vulnerabilities that have been discovered
through scanning softwares. In addition, since newly released services tend to have
more vulnerabilities than services that have been in use since long, using the service
release time contributes too to the overall service vulnerability analysis. in summary,
it is possible to measure the Vulnerability Score VS(s) of a service s which appeared
in the alert a based on the current vulnerability score V Sc(s), the past vulnerability
score V Sp(s), and the release time RT (s) of the service.
In order to determine the set of services, applications, and operating systems that
the network is running, and consequently find out the current and historical vulnera-
bilities associated with them, available network scanning software, such as Nmap [16],
or Nessus [11] can be used. For both existing and historical vulnerabilities, we are in-
terested in the severity score SS. The service release time RT (s) serves an indicator of
the stability of the service. As shown in figure 3.4, experience has shown that services




A raised alert a explicitly mentions the targeted service s (including the application,
OS, or service) that the attacker is trying to violate. In may cases, the targeted service
can also be determined from the port number that is stated in the alert. For a specific
or group of targeted services Si(s), we can explore the existing vulnerabilities Vi(s) and
calculate the value of the EV S based on the severity score SS of these vulnerabilities.
However, there is a difference between vulnerabilities having a published solution that
has not yet been applied, and vulnerabilities that still wait for a solution. The V Se score
is more biased towards the highest severity score SS(v) of the existing vulnerabilities.









For the historical vulnerability score V Sh(s) of service s, vulnerability knowledge bases,
such as CVE, are consulted to measure the stability of the service in the past. The
criticality, represented by the severity score SS, of the past vulnerabilities can be
high, medium, or low. High risk vulnerabilities receive a high score while low risk
vulnerabilities receive a low score. In addition, the severity of a vulnerability decreases
as it gains in age, reflecting the fact that vulnerabilities known since long tend to be no
more efficient. As a result, old vulnerabilities receive low scores. Equation 3.8 shows
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Finally, the overall vulnerability score V S(s) of a service s is computed as the weighted
average of V Se, V Sh, and RT :
V S(s) = η1 × V Se(s) + η2 × V Sh(s) + η3 ×RT (s) (3.9)
3.2.6 Relationship Between Alerts
Usually attackers launch their attacks in multiple steps in order to achieve the final
goal. The early steps are a preparation for the later ones. Calculating the final score
of the alert will involve evaluation of the relationship between the current alert and
the previous ones. The score of the currently evaluated alert will increase if there
is a relationship with any of the stored alerts. In this metric, we will restrict our
investigation to the alerts that happened in a short period -say a couple hours- from
the current alert. This restriction helps discarding very old alerts and focusing on
recent ones since attackers typically try to achieve their goal as soon as possible before
they can be identified.
The relationship between two alerts ai and aj is based on computing the simi-
larity between their respective source IP addresses (Simsip), destination IP addresses
(Simdip), source ports (Simspt), and destination ports (Simdpt). The source IP ad-
dresses similarity Simsip is computed by using the simple matching coefficient equa-
tion as shown in e eq.3.10. A similar formula exists for Simdip. However, calculating
the similarity between two sources IP addresses is subject to two constraints. First,
taking into consideration the subnet that the IP addresses are belong to. If the source
addresses of the current alert and the previous alert share the same subnet then the
(Simsip) will be high. Secondly, any difference in the Most Significant bits of the IP
addresses will make the (Simsip) low, unlike the changed of the last significant bits.
For the ports number, Simspt and Simdpt are computed booleanly which produces one
if the port numbers match and zero otherwise.
Simsip(a1, a2) =
∑
similar bits(SIP (a1), SIP (a2))∑
all bits(SIP (a1), SIP (a2))
(3.10)
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Figure 3.5: Attack Type Similarity provided in [37]
The overall similarity is a weighted sum of the four similarities mentioned above.
Sim(ai, aj) =
wsipSimsip + wdipSimdip + wsptSimspt + wdptSimdpt
wsip + wdip + wspt + wdpt
(3.11)
The relationship between two alerts (eq.3.12) is then computed by taking into
account the follow up probability record between the corresponding type of attack
of the alerts. This is a measure of the probability that an attack of type T (aj) is
followed by an attack of type T (ai). The values of these are taken from the statistical
analysis proposed by Valdes et al in [37]. As shown in figure 3.5, attacks are categorized
into several incident classes based on their type. The probability that one incident class
can be followed by another one is also provided in the figure. For instance, a probe
incident class can be followed by access violation incident class with high probability,
but this is not the case when it is the other way around since this it is not symmetric.
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Algorithm 1 Alerts Relationship Algorithm
Require: Current Alert, Alert Log `
Ensure: Relationship Degree
1: A= {ai | ai ∈ ` & Timestamp(ai) within time window RW }, n = |A|.
2: for i = 0 to n do
3: Calculate the Relationship Score between Current Alert and ai
4: if Relationship Score > Highest Relationship Score then
5: Highest Relationship Score= Relationship Score
6: else
7: Keep the Highest Relationship Score
8: end if
9: end for
10: Return Relationship Score
R(ai, aj) = P (T (aj), T (ai))× Sim(ai, aj) (3.12)
Finally, the relationship score of an alert ai (eq.3.13) is equal to the maximum
relationship score it has with the alerts that occurred at most RW time units before ai




Algorithm 1 illustrates the procedure of evaluating the relationship between alerts.
The algorithm starts by specifying the time window RW that the relationship scores
will be calculated between the current alert and the previous ones. We will consider
the highest relationship score between two alerts as the overall alert relationship score.
3.2.7 Social Activity- Target and Source
A social network is a social structure made of nodes that are tied by one or more
specific types of relations [15]. In this metric, we are trying to construct and analyze
the social network for the source and target that are stated in the alerts’ attribute.
The node of the social network will be the source address, target address, attack ID,
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Figure 3.6: Portion of Fuzzy Logic Inference System
and the sites the user has visited. The relationship between the nodes differs according
to the object of the node. For instance, the social relationship between an attacker and
a victim raises an ”alerted” situation, whereas if it were a worm and host, we would
have an ”infected” situation. Our main goal in this metric is to find a triangular
relationship that involves a hidden participant. This hidden participant could be a
previous activity of the recent attacker.
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Table 3.2: Fuzzy Logic Inference Rules
Criteria Rule1 Rule2 Rule3 Rule4 Rule5 Rule6 Rule7 Rule8 Rule9 Rule10
Applicability High High Avg Avg - High Avg High Avg -
Importance High High High High Avg High Avg Low Avg Low
Sensor Status High High Avg Low Avg Avg Avg High Avg Low
Severity High High High Avg Low Avg - Avg - Low
Weaknesses High Avg High - Avg Low - - Low Low
Relationship High High Avg Avg Avg - Low Low Low -
Social Activity High Avg High Avg - Low - - Low Low
Alert Score High High High Avg Low High Avg Avg High Low
3.3 Fuzzy Logic Inference Approach
A Fuzzy logic system reasons about the data by using a collection of fuzzy membership
functions and rules. It makes clear conclusions possible to derive from imprecise infor-
mation. In this regard, it resembles human decision making because of its ability to
work with approximate data and find precise results. Fuzzy logic differs from classical
logic in that it does not require a deep understanding of the system, exact equations,
or precise numeric values. It incorporates an alternative way of thinking, which allows
for complex modeling of systems using a high-level of abstraction of gained knowledge
and experience. Fuzzy logic allows the expression of qualitative knowledge, includ-
ing phrases such as “too hot” and “not bad”, which are mapped to exact numeric
ranges [27, 36].
For the above reasons, we used a Fuzzy logic system to reason about IDS alerts.
Results coming from the metrics presented in the previous section are used as input
to Fuzzy logic Inference engine in order to investigate the seriousness of the generated
alerts. The Fuzzy logic system requires a definition of the membership functions of all
input metrics. In addition, fuzzy rules need to be defined in order to formulate the
conditional statements that make the fuzzy inference. There are five parts of the fuzzy
inference process: (1) fuzzification of the input variables, (2) application of the fuzzy
operator (AND or OR) to the antecedent, (3) implication from the antecedent to the
consequent, (4) aggregation of the consequents across the rules, and (5) defuzzification.
38
Membership Functions (MF) are curves that define how each point in the input
space is mapped to a membership value (or degree of membership) between 0 and 1. To
achieve the smoothness and concise notation [43], we use Gaussian distribution curve
as the type of the membership functions.
Rules are defined from domain expert as shown in Table 3.2. Rules in a fuzzy expert
system are usually of a form similar to the following:
if applicability is High and severity is Avg then set alert score to High
where applicability and Severity are input variables, score is an output variable, High
is a membership function (fuzzy subset) defined on applicability, Avg is a membership
function defined on severity, and High is a membership function defined on the alert
score.
In FuzMet approach, we use Fuzzy Logic to score the alerts generated by any IDS,
given some evidence from several sources namely, the alert itself, the environment
where the alert is raised, and the vulnerability knowledge base. As shown in figure 3.6,
Fuzzy Logic Inference first takes the input values from the metrics (e.g., applicability,
severity, importance, and relationship metrics) and then fuzzify these inputs by using
the membership functions. Then, the rules will be evaluated to generate the output
set for each active rule. All the outputs will be aggregated and a single fuzzy set will
be provided. Then this fuzzy set will be defuzzified in order to give a numeric value
that represents the seriousness of the alert.
3.4 Alert Rescoring Approach
The main goal of the alert re-scoring technique is to score alerts that are already
scored based on their relationship with the current alert. One of the reasons for re-
scoring alerts is to notify the security administrators with the early steps of the attack,
that may be scored low. Another reason is to emphasize the previous activities of
an attacker who is launching a very critical attack. However, the method of scoring
alerts only once will limit the security administrators in identifying the non-critical
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early-steps of the attack, especially if a filtering technique is used discarding those
low scored alerts. Also, high-level alert management techniques such as correlation or
clustering can benefit from re-scoring and provide more accurate results.
Alert management techniques such as aggregation, grouping, scoring, filtering, clus-
tering, correlation, and fusion were proposed to deal with the large number of alerts
and present an abstraction of these alerts. First, alerts are aggregated from multiple
IDSs then similar alerts will be grouped together into hyper-alerts. Scoring function
will evaluate the hyper-alerts and assign a score for each one according to its impor-
tance or seriousness. Low-score alerts will be discarded and they will not be involved in
any further analysis. Then, correlation functions may be applied to present the attack
scenarios. Clearly, scoring alerts once will discard the early non-critical attack that
prepare for a later critical attack. Consequently, the early steps of the attackers will
not be involved in any further analysis such as attack scenario construction. For in-
stance, attackers first scan the victim machine by launching an IPSweep attack. This
probe will be scored low according to its seriousness and impact. Later, the attackers
launch a SadmindBufferOverflow attack based on the vulnerability findings of the
scanned machine. This attack will be assigned a high score since it is a critical at-
tack. The security administrator can not see the early steps of the attack if a filtering
operation is applied. On one hand, involving only the critical alerts in the high-level
operations, such as correlation, will prevent the non-critical early steps of the attack to
be considered. On the other hand, involving all alerts in the high-level operation will
make the total number of correlated alerts unmanageable manually. Hence it is impor-
tant to highlight only the critical alerts and their related alerts. Therefore, we perform
a re-scoring of alerts based on the prepare − for relationship and the trustfulness of
attacks. The prepare − for checks if there is any relationship between the currently
evaluated alert and the entire alerts log. The trustfulness examines the previous activ-
ities of the current source of the attack if the launched attack is critical. Then we can
adjust the value of trustfulness for this source in our source evaluation metric.
Security analysts can apply the rescoring function periodically (at the end of the
day) or before applying the high-level management techniques. Algorithm 2 illustrates
the rescoring process in FuzMet. The algorithm starts by taking the alert log, the
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Algorithm 2 Alerts Rescoring Algorithm
Require: Alert Log `, Score threshold ST , Relationship threshold WT
Ensure: Rescored Alert log
1: A= {a(i) | a(i) ∈ ` }, n=|A|.
2: B= {a(j) | a(j) ∈ `
∧
0 < Timestamp(a(i))- Timestamp(a(j)) < WT }, m=|B|.
3: for i=0 to n do
4: for i=0 to m do
5: Calculate Relationship: R = Relationship(a(i), a(j))
6: if R > ν
∧
AlertScore(a(i)) > ST then
7: Fetch the Applicability of a(j)
8: if a(j) is Applicable
∧
AlertScore(a(j)) < υ then
9: Rescore a(j) where AlertRescore(a(j)) > ST
10: else
11: Keep the Alert Score
12: end if
13: else




18: Return Alert with Rescore Value
score threshold for prioritizing alerts, and the window time WT that limits the alerts
involved in calculating the relationship degree. For each alert in the log, we calculate
its relationship with the previous alerts within the window time WT . If the score of the
current alert is high and the relationship degree is strong, then the involved previous
alert is a candidate for rescoring. In order to rescore this alert, we further investigate
its applicability against the protected network as well as its score should be low. If
the conditions have been satisfied, then the alert will be rescored and prioritized for
further investigation.
Alert Evaluation Architecture and Priority Scheme 41
3.5 FuzMet configuration issues
The FuzMet IDS uses a number of metrics, fuzzy inference rules, and alert rescoring
mechanisms all of which have several configurable parameters which influence the pre-
cision of intrusion detection and alert prioritization. The security administrator has a
number of parameters that can be configured while others are not. Non-configurable
parameters include the severity score values SSi(a) gathered from security expert or-
ganizations, sensor update status and accuracy, and the attack follow up probability
matrix P (eq.3.12). The set of configurable parameters includes the five parameters of
the weight function w (sec.3.2) which in turn influence the machine importance metric
I(m) (eq.3.3), the severity score metric SS (eq.3.6), the existing vulnerability metric
V Se (eq.3.7), and the historical vulnerability metric V Sh (eq.3.8). The importance
I(s) of each service s and the importance of each user account I(a) need also to be
configured in order to reflect the criticality of each service, user account, and machine.
The sensor status metric has four configurable weight parameters. The severity score
metric (eq.3.6) requires the definition of δ(i, v(a)) for each severity score provider i
and targeted victim v(a) tuple. This parameter can be made into a more static form
δi if only a single trust value is given to a severity score provider independent of the
target victim. The service vulnerability metric (eq.3.9) has an additional four param-
eters including the decay coefficient λ as well as the three ηi weights. The relationship
metric (eq.3.13) has also four additional parameters. This makes the overall number
of configurable parameters equal to:
Ncfgp = 17 + |services|+ |accounts|+ |scoresources| × |victims| (3.14)
Besides metric configuration, there is a need to define the appropriate fuzzy in-
ference rules which help in capturing the severity of each attack. As can be noticed,
providing an optimal configuration of the FuzMet system is not trivial to say the least.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented FuzMet automatic method of evaluating alerts generated
by IDS. Our main gaol was prioritizing the critical alerts to the security analysts among
large number of alerts mixed with high rate of false positive. In order to achieve this,
number of criteria were proposed. Applicability of the attack, the importance of victim,
the relationship between the alert under evaluation and the previous alerts, and the
social activities between the attackers and the victims are examples of the metrics we
use to prioritize IDS alerts. These metrics are used as inputs of a Fuzzy-logic system in
order to investigate the seriousness of the generated alerts and quantitatively calculate a
score for each alert. This evaluation process will prioritize alerts when presented to the
security administrator for further investigation. Additionally, we propose a rescoring
technique to dynamically score alerts based on the relationship between attacks or the




This Chapter reports our evaluation methods conducted to validate the effectiveness
of our proposed approach. First, the most popular datasets used in our experiments
are described in section 4.2, namely, DARPA 2000 specific intrusion detection scenario
dataset. [21]. In Section 4.3, we present the accomplished results of alert prioritization
approach, FuzMet, which are divided into two parts. The first part shows the results of
FuzMet carries out with only one configuration parameter set while the second present
the experiments conducted with different configuration parameters sets and both are
compared with snort results. Also, the consequences of the rescoring technique are
shown in section 4.4. Finally, we conclude this chapter by describing the lessons gained
by the conducted experiments in Section 4.5.
4.1 Overview of Alert Evaluation Experiments
One of the first concerns faced by those who are working in IDS alert management
is how to find data sets that are appropriate for testing, evaluating, and validating
their proposed algorithms. Generally, there are two methods used in this context.
These methods are not only for evaluating alert management techniques but also for
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testing new intrusion detection algorithms. The first method is building a simulated
network and collecting the relevant data for further investigations. However, creating
a simulated network environment with hundreds of computers is often difficult and ex-
pensive. Also, simulated network environments may yield traffic that does not mimic
a real network due to the inherent nature of simulated traffic [22]. Most importantly,
comparing the results obtained through a simulated network environment with other
results is not possible since both are using different environments. The second possible
method is using the previously collected data sets. These data sets contain real attack
instances on real networks which are publicly available for research purposes. Using
the available data sets saves the development time and efforts. It is possible to com-
pare results conducted by applying different approaches to the same data set. Several
popular data sets are available such as, the DARPA Evaluation data sets cite[DARPA],
the Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) CUP 1999 competition data set [6],
and DEFCON [35]. In our experiments, we used the second method for testing and
validating the FuzMet approach. The characteristics of the data sets were suitable for
our requirements. Particularly, we used the 2000 DARPA Intrusion Detection Scenario
Specific Data Sets.
4.2 2000 DARPA Intrusion Detection Scenario Spe-
cific Data Sets
For the sake of testing and evaluating the efficiency of the IDS, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has provided a number of Intrusion Detection
Evaluation Data Sets including the 1998, 1999, 2000 Data sets. In this thesis, we used
the latter one. The 2000 data set contains attack scenario that includes a distributed
denial of service attack “DDoS”. This attack scenario is carried out over multiple
network and audit sessions in which an attacker probes the network, breaks into a host
by exploiting existing vulnerability, installs the software required to launch a DDoS
attack, and finally launches the DDoS attack against an off-site server. The 2000
dataset is divided into two data sets namely, LLDOS 1.0 and LLDOS 2.0.
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4.2.1 LLDOS 1.0 Data sets
In general, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is the type of attack conducted in this
data set. in order for the attacker to achieve this gaol, number of different attacks are
used as preparation steps. The attacker starts by using a scripted attack to break into
a variety of hosts. This step is conducted by scanning all subnets in the target network
looking for alive hosts, and identifying which alive hosts are running Solaris sadmind
service by using rpc port scan. Then, the attacker uses the Solaris sadmind exploit,
a well-known Remote-To-Root attack, to successfully gain root privileges in Solaris
hosts in the targeted network. With the root access in the compromised machine, the
attacker install the Mstream DDOS tool, that is capable of flooding target systems
with high volumes of TCP packets [12], as the final preparation steps for lunching
DDoS. Finally, the attacker launch a DDOS from the compromised network (by the
installed DDoS tool) to an off-site server.
During the time of launching the attack, number of sensors were install in the
network to record all the traffic including all attack instances. The DARPA LLDOS
1.0 dataset contains traffic collected from two network zones: “DMZ” and “inside”.
The series of attacks in the dataset are carried over multiple sessions or phases, the
interval times of which are shown in Table 4.1. A summary of the five phases of the
attack scenario are:
1. Scans the network in order to launch a DDOS attack against an off-site server.
2. Looks for the sadmind daemon of live IP.
3. Break in hosts by exploiting a sadmind vulnerability.
4. Installing a mstream Trojan on the compromised machine.
5. Launches the DDoS attack against the remote site.
4.2.2 LLDOS 2.0 Data sets
The second attack scenario data set includes a similar sequence of attacks run by an
attacker who is a bit more complicated than the one in version LLDOS 1.0. The main
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difference between LLDOS 2.0. and LLDOS 1.0 is that in LLDOS 2.0.2 the attacker
uses DNS HINFO queries for probing the host, platform, and operating system rather
than Sweeping IP’s and using RPC port scaning. Also, the attacker tries to break in one
host by exploiting the sadmind vulnerability and gain root privileges where he continues
to compromise other hosts unlike the LLDOS 1.0 where the attack compromise each
vulnerable host individually. From this point, the attacker proceeds to install the DDoS
componenet and launches the DDoS attack. The five phases of the attack scenario are
summarized as follows:
1. Probe of one host, Eyrie’s public DNS server, via the HINFO query
2. Break in the host via the sadmind exploit.
3. Upload of mstream DDoS software and attack script (to break-into more hosts).
4. Initiate attack on other hosts
5. Launching the DDoS
4.3 Prioritizing Attacks Observations
In order to validate the effectiveness of the FuzMet approach for prioritizing IDS alerts.
The DARPA 2000 intrusion detection LLDOS dataset 1.0 [21] was used and the gener-
ated alerts were stored in a MySQL database. Java was used to compute the different
metrics related to the alerts. These metrics were then input to the fuzzy rule set of
in order to generate FuzMet alert scores. Matlab Fuzzy Logic toolbox [36] was used
for the fuzzy rules specification. Finally, we compared FuzMet alert scores with the
ones generated by Snort. This results section is divided into two parts. The first part
shows the output of Snort and FuzMet for one configuration set and details the com-
parison between them. The second part focuses on the optimal configuration problem
and presents the result of a selected set of results from among a set of 200 conducted
simulations.
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Table 4.1: Prioritized alerts of the DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0 Dataset using Snort
4.3.1 Alert scoring
Snort was used with the maximum detection capability to scan and detect intrusions
within the binary tcpdump file of both of the “inside” and “DMZ” traffics. Snort
reported 3502 alerts (321 inside, and 3181 DMZ). In order to filter out redundant
alerts, we employed a grouping of alerts based on exact similarity within a specific
window of time. This resulted in a new total of 156 alerts (Table 4.1), thus a gain of
95.5%.
The FuzMet scoring technique was applied to the alerts generated by Snort. For
each alert, we compute the value of all the metrics we defined earlier, except for the
sensor status, service vulnerability, and social activity metrics because the used dataset
does not provide knowledge about the status of the targeted services and applications
of the evaluation network. However, the other metrics were good enough to prioritize
the most critical alerts. The attacker in the first phase tries to scan the network by
employing the ICMP echo-request, looking for “up” hosts. Snort generates 816 alerts as
a response to attacker’s ICMP requests and the hosts ICMP replies. FuzMet evaluated
these antecedents and scored them as low (1.2-2.3) as shown in Table 4.1. In the second
phase, we received 259 alerts from the traffic of both the DMZ and inside parts, which
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Figure 4.1: Fuzzy logic inference engine
represents the attacker’s attempts to probe the discovered live hosts from the previous
phase to determine which hosts are running the sadmind remote administration tool.
We scored these alerts differently based on the context in which they occurred. For
instance, the “RPC portmap sadmind request UDP” alert that was triggered by the
activity targeting the inside firewall interface is scored low. However, this alert is scored
high when the target host is running a sadmind service. The remote-to-root exploit
has been tried several times in the third phase and Snort raised 92 alerts of which we
prioritized 34. Since we focus on evaluating alerts generated by Network-IDSs, we did
not involve the audit data from the hosts in the network and, therefore, phase 4 was
not included. The DDOS attacks in phase five triggered 141 alerts which we prioritized
as critical events.
Table 4.1 summarizes the results of the FuzMet alert scoring (with and without the
grouping function) technique on the DARPA 2000 dataset. FuzMet alert prioritization
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Figure 4.2: FuzzMet vs. Snort scores (Over Time)
was effective in identifying the false positive alerts which Snort failed to detect. For
example, Snort generates a “MS-SQL version overflow attempt” alert with the highest
priority, but we scored this alert low based on our criteria since the target address
is running a Mac operating system and this attack is impossible to succeed in this
context. Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show that after we score the alert, a security administrator
can be provided with the most important alerts unlike the result of Snort which assigns
a level-two priority (out of 3) to most of the alerts.
4.3.2 FuzMet optimal configuration
As discussed in section 3.5, the parametrization of the FuzMet alert scoring system
determines its effectiveness. Mis-configuration can easily lead to imprecise outcomes,
which consequently results into missed attacks. The objective is hence to determine
the optimal configuration of the FuzMet set of parameters. Because the used dataset
does not come with information about network topology, set of running services, and
the different user accounts, a number of FuzMet metrics couldn’t be involved in the
experiments. These include the sensor status, service vulnerability, and social relation-
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Figure 4.3: FuzzMet vs. Snort scores (By Number)
ship metrics. The metrics which were used are the applicability, importance, severity,
and relationship metrics. For simplicity, all severity score sources were given equal
confidence (δ(i, v(a)) = 1).
200 simulations have been conducted with different configuration parameters in
order to determine an optimal configuration set. An optimal configuration set is the one
which makes FuzMet prioritize only those alerts which actually belong to the DDOS
attack phases. Due to space limitation, only four representative simulations will be
shown in this section. Table 4.4 shows the parameters of the severity and relationship
metrics for the selected simulations. The weight group contains the configuration
parameters for the w function which directly affects the severity score metric (eq.3.6).
Table 4.2 shows the configuration parameters related to the importance metric. A value
of 1 indicates of low importance while a value of 3 indicates a highest importance. A
value of 0 indicates the case where the target machine is unknown or that the value
has not yet been configured. Simulation S1 showed the worst result among the 200
simulations. Only one single alert was given high priority (figure 4.4(a)). The result
can be explained by the fact that the machines running the sadmind service, core to
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Figure 4.4: Configuration results
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the DDOS attack, have been assigned a null importance (172.16.112.10, 172.16.112.50,
and 172.16.115.20). In S2, 31 alerts have been assigned high priority (figure 4.4(b)). S2
differs from S1 mainly in the importance metrics where the machines that are running
Sadmind have now a non zero importance. S3 gives a high priority to 11 alerts only
(figure 4.4(c)). However, if the high priority threshold is lowered from 8 down to 7,
S3 records a number of 66 high priority alerts, hence equaling those generated by S4
(figure 4.4(d)). S4 manages to generate the best result among the 200 simulations
with a number of 66 high score alerts and the highest average score of 4.02. S3 and
S4 have the same importance configuration and differ in the weight and relationship
parameters. S4 is considered the best configuration not only based on the number
of high alert scores. In fact, out of the four identifiable phases of the DDOS attack,
only S4 manages to detect all of them with a strong precision for phases 2 and 3 and a
high-medium precision for phases 1 and 5 (phase 4 is only detectable by a host IDS and
as such is excluded from the evaluation). In contrast, Snort manages to identify only
phase 2. Figure 4.4(e) plots the results of S4 based on time rather than on the number
of alerts and shows the concentration of high score alerts for phases 2 and 3 which last
09:03 and 01:51 mins respectively. S4 records 58 high score alerts for phase 3, with a
duration of 01:49 mins. This interval is almost equal to the exact duration of phase 3
of the attack which corresponds to the exploitation of the sadmind vulnerability. It is
to note also that even S1 manages to generate one high score alert for phase 3 while
Snort misses that phase completely and only detects phase 2 out of the four detectable
phases.
4.4 Rescoring Alert Results and Advantages
We applied FuzMet rescoring technique to the alerts that are scored previously. As
we discussed earlier in section 4.3.1, a simple alert grouping technique was applied
to the alert log to remove the alerts redundancy (similar alerts occur in close time).
This technique groups together the alerts that are similar in their IP addresses, port
numbers, attack type. The grouped alerts represent all the attacker’s steps used to
launch a DDOS attack which are considered for rescoring. Since LLDOS 1.0 dataset
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Figure 4.5: Alert Rescoring approach (By Number)
consists of only one complete attack scenario, the first phase, which contains non-
critical attacks (regular scanning), is good candidate for rescoring for two reasons.
First, it is considered to be a preparation step for later attacks. Second, FuzMet scores
the alerts generated by this phase as low. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the alerts
related to the first phase to check the usefulness of our rescoring approach.
In phase one, the attacker starts to scan the network at 09:51:36 until 09:52:02 by
performing a scripted IPsweep of multiple class C subnets on the victim network.
Previously, this phase was scored low by FuzMet according to its seriousness and
impact. FuzMet successfully rescored this phase to be attached with the other phases
of DDoS attack scenario. As shown in figure 4.5, the alerts related to phase one were
scored between (1.35 to 4.38) but after applying the rescoring function their score
increased to be 8. The rescoring value were chosen to be 8 to insure that the rescored
alerts will be included in the prioritized alert set. As a result, all the critical alerts
as well as the preparation steps have been prioritized and presented to the security
analyst.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented the experimentation results of FuzMet; a system that uses
fuzzy logic inference to evaluate and prioritize IDS alerts based on several metrics. We
defined seven metrics related to the applicability of the alert, importance of the target,
sensor status, alert severity score, service vulnerability, alerts static relationships, and
the social relationships between system users. In the experiments, we use Snort with
its maximum detection capability to scan the DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0 dataset. We
applied our scoring algorithm to the alerts generated by snort and the results showed
that the security analyst can recognize the critical alerts among the others. A number
of 200 simulations were conducted in order to determine optimal configuration for
FuzMet since it has high number of configuration parameters required by the different
metrics and fuzzy logic engine.
While Snort detected only one phase of the four detectable phases of the attack
the best configuration of FuzMet managed to detect all of those phases with a good
precision for two of the phases and a very good precision for the others. Unexpectedly,
even worst case configuration of FuzMet did also good in the sense that it managed to
raise one single high score alert for a phase which Snort did not detect at all.
The conducted simulations showed the viability of the FuzMet approach at least
for the selected intrusion scenario. In addition, the divergent behavior of FuzMet
depending on how it is configured helped in identifying the configuration which leads
to best performance wherein all attack phases are identified.
Chapter 5
Conclusion And Future Work
After implementing an intrusion detection system, one realizes that detecting intrusions
is not the only challenge to solve. In fact, managing the large number of generated alerts
is also a demanding task for the security analysts. Evaluating these alerts manually can
be difficult, error-prone, and time-consuming. Therefore, automatic alert evaluation
and prioritization are needed to keep the number of alerts in a human control. We
argue that with the presence of the attack knowledge base, network information, basic
alert attributes, and some security administrator we can judge about the seriousness of
each alerts generated by an IDS. As a result, only critical alerts (which are reasonably
in small number) will be prioritized for further investigation by security administrators.
Involving unrelated alerts at the high-level management techniques such as clustering
and correlation is another problem we are trying to address in this thesis. With these
unrelated alerts, the results of the high-level management approaches will be either
inaccurate (by involving only critical alerts) or difficult to manage (by involving all
reported alerts). For instance, one of the correlation graph produced by correlating a
large number of alerts, consist of 2,940 nodes and 25,321 edges as reported in [29]. A
human user will have difficulties in analyzing such a graph in a short period of time.
Therefore, we proposed a rescoring approach aiming to involve into the prioritized alert
set those non critical alerts that prepare for critical ones. As a result, the critical alerts
as well as the preparation steps will be prioritized and presented to security analyst.
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5.1 Summary of Contributions
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• An automatic alert evaluation and prioritization framework that make the man-
agement task for the security analysts easier and controllable.
• A re-scoring technique that dynamically score alerts based on relationship be-
tween attacks.
• A comprehensive study of the impact of different configurations of the proposed
metrics on the accuracy and the completeness of the alert scores generated by
FuzMet.
• A survey and taxonomy of IDS alert management techniques.
5.2 Thesis Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, we presented FuzMet; an approach that automatically evaluates IDS
alerts band prioritizes the critical ones based on a number of criteria. These include
the applicability of the attack, the importance of victim, status of the sensor, the
severity of the attack, the relationship between the alert under evaluation and the
previous alerts, and the social relationships between system users. We used a Fuzzy-
logic inference mechanism in order to score alerts. This score represents the seriousness
of the alerts. The Fuzzy-logic approach receives the values calculated by the metrics
for each alert as inputs and compute the overall score for that alert. Furthermore,
we developed a rescoring technique that enabled us to rescore alerts to show the early
steps of the attackers. This technique tries to increase the score of the alerts that were
already scored low but which participated in preparing for later attacks. Additionally,
this thesis presents the specification and configuration issues of FuzMet. Because of the
high number of configuration parameters required by the different metrics and fuzzy
logic engine, this paper particularly emphasized the problem of optimal configuration
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for FuzMet. The simulations were specifically conducted in order to determine such a
configuration.
In the experimentation, the FuzMet approach has been applied onto the alerts
generated by Snort with its maximum detection capability and using the DARPA 2000
LLDOS 1.0 dataset. The dataset features a distributed denial of service attack on a
remote site. For the scoring approach, we successfully prioritized the most critical alerts
which are relatively small comparing with the number of generated alerts. FuzMet
prioritized the critical alerts that are related to the launched attacks, unlike Snort which
scores most of the alerts as medium. For rescoring approach, the results showed that
all the non critical alerts that prepared for any critical ones were rescored and included
with the set of the prioritized alerts. For finding the best configuration parameters
of FuzMet metrics, a number of simulations were conducted and selected results were
presented. The conducted simulations showed the viability of the FuzMet approach at
least for the selected intrusion scenario. In addition, the divergent behavior of FuzMet
depending on how it is configured helped in identifying the configuration which leads
to best performance wherein all attack phases are identified. However, even with the
obtained results, we did not completely solve the configuration problem of FuzMet.
In fact, many of the metrics were not configurable due to the absence of their related
data from the chosen scenario dataset. In addition, it is not possible to prove that the
identified best simulation is the actual optimal configuration; or even whether it is the
best just for that particular data set. The search space involves a considerable number
of parameters and further analytical analysis is required.
Although, our objective is to make the evaluation process more manageable for the
security analysts, still we are concerned about the detection of the real attack in our
evaluation process. Since our mechanism of prioritizing the critical alerts depends on
the successful attack detection by the deployed IDS, the attacks will not be prioritized
if the IDS missed them. Additionally, the computing time for calculating the values of
each metrics and the application of the Fuzzy-logic reasoning eliminates the real-time
alert prioritization approach. However, real-time alert ranking is not essential in an
Intrusion Detection Systems, unlike intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) which require
real-time alert detection and prioritization mechanism.
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5.3 Future Directions
In the state of our work, several future research avenues can be followed:
• The used dataset was conducted in 2000 by DARPA. It is interesting to use
more recent data sets that contain new attack instances to test FuzMet with.
Also validating the capability of FuzMet by using real attack scenarios designed
particulary to prove its effectiveness is required.
• The alert relationship metrics defined in section 3.3.6 is based on the similarity
between alert. It is interesting to test different relationship strategies such as
the one that is based on the prerequisites and consequences of the attacks.(these
were discussed in section 2.3.4).
• As discussed in section 2.2.1, anomaly-based IDSs generate alerts whenever the
traffic differs from the norm by a certain threshold. Investigating the usefulness
of FuzMet as an anomaly-based IDS is an interesting direction since no work has
been done in this regard.
• Providing an analytical study of the alert prioritization, rescoring mechanism,
the configuration problem of the identified metrics, and the Fuzzy-logic rules and
inference engine is an appropriate extension to this research. By doing so, we
can validate the conducted results by comparing the results carried out by the
simulations with the results carried out by the analytical models.
• Investigating the alert analysis component that includes attack distance, occur-
rence time, and response plan is considered for our future works.
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